-/- I noted two directions in which the scientific worker is seeking to advance. He is trying to give a more complete account of the actual detail of what is happening, and he is seeking wider and wider generalizations. As an observer, he must note what he observes, and, it would seem, omit nothing. But in seeking generalizations he must select, from among the features he observes, only those which he takes to be of general significance. Thence arises at least (...) the appearance of a conflict in his activities. If he is too intent on the details of what he observes, his generalizations suffer; but if he leaves aside details too readily, his generalizations suffer equally. There is danger both in omitting and in not omitting. (shrink)

In previous articles I have been concerned with various aspects of science; and I have now to endeavour to look at scientific activity as a whole, and to view it in its relation to other activities of man. I have been trying to avoid those pleasant sweeping generalizations which strike the imagination and which are so easy to write and to read about: such as that science is our only avenue to truth; or that science is abstract and tells us (...) nothing about the concrete nature of things; or that knowledge of particular facts is the object of science, generalizations being merely a means thereto; or that generalizations are the object of science, investigation of particular facts being merely a means thereto; all of which can be defended by a rich array of arguments, none of which can finally stand confrontation with the actual nature of scientific activity as a whole. The situation seems to be much more complicated than any such generalizations would suggest. (shrink)

Philosophical Studies Vol. 2, No. 2, p. 163, l. 24 for ‘Pocreon’ read “Creon’ and p. 165, l.4 for “Nereus” read “Nessus”, l. 16 for “Corrolate” read “Correlate” and l. 27 for “ Trachinae ” read “ Trachiniae ”. Proffessor Mackinnon should also have been described as Norris-Hulse Professor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge and Fellow of Corpus Christi College.

Zu einer bestimmten Zeit war Leibniz der Überzeugung, die Naturgesetze seien aus dem Begriff der Materie als dessen, was Raum erfüllt, ableitbar. Der Autor zeigt, wie Leibniz unter dem Einfluß von Huygens zur Aufgabe dieser Überzeugung gelangte. Ferner diskutiert er die Prinzipien, die Leibniz in seiner Philosophie der Wissenschaft zu benutzen begann, und zwar die Prinzipien des Grundes, des Besten, der Kontinuität, der größten Mannigfaltigkeit und der größten Determiniertheit. Er erläutert außerdem die Argumente, die Leibniz aus der Physik für die (...) Wiedereinführung der substantiellen Formen herleitete, und legt dar, daß nichts von dem, was Leibniz über die substantiellen Formen sagt, irgendetwas zur Rechtfertigung des Kraftgesetzes, das einen Teil seiner Physik bildet, beiträgt. (shrink)

It is not only in science that abstraction is found as a method of dealing with the world, and we may profitably begin by showing its wide use in ordinary practical life.